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An experimental tregua (truce) signed last year by rival street gangs has cut El Salvador’s horrific
homicide numbers by more than half. A remarkable turnaround for a country that until recently
had the world’s second-highest per capita murder rate, the Salvadoran experience is inspiring
similar efforts in Honduras. Guatemalan leaders are taking note as well, prompting some wishful
thinkers to contemplate a "second peace" for Central America.
And yet, for all of its apparent success, the 15-month-old gang truce currently finds itself on shaky
ground. A mid-May ruling by the Consejo Suprema de Justicia (CSJ) forced the government’s point
man on the project, then Security Minister David Munguía Payés, to resign. Shortly afterwards,
El Salvador’s main opposition party began to openly attack the truce, saying there will be "no
more negotiating with criminals" should it win back the presidency in the February 2014 national
elections. Gang leaders say they are still committed to the cease-fire, though just how much control
they exercise over their tens of thousands of criminal underlings remains an open question.
Munguía took over as security minister in late 2011, pledging to cut the country’s homicide rate
by 30% within a year. Few excepted he would have much success. His immediate predecessors
had all tried—and failed—to tame El Salvador’s violent crime epidemic. Thanks to the gang truce,
however, Munguía proved his skeptics wrong, earning himself a healthy dose of political capital in
the process.
In 2009, the year President Mauricio Funes took office, police reported nearly 4,400 murders, a
staggering number for a country that, in both population and land area, is roughly the same size
as the US state of Massachusetts (NotiCen, March 11, 2010). The numbers dropped slightly in 2010
but again topped the 4,300 mark in 2011 (NotiCen, Oct. 27, 2011). Last year, after the truce went into
effect, the body count suddenly plunged: the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) registered 2,576 murders,
the lowest number since 2003. "We’ve distanced ourselves from the embarrassing position of being
the second-most-violent country in the world," Munguía told reporters last November (NotiCen,
Dec. 20, 2012).
The Funes administration originally tried to downplay its role in the cease-fire, crediting negotiators
Fabio Colindres, a Catholic bishop, and Raúl Mijango, a former Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional (FMLN) guerilla, with leading what was they claimed was an independent
initiative (NotiCen, July 12, 2012). Months later, however, Munguía hinted that the gang truce had
always been part of his "strategy." Many observers suspect he was one of the chief architects of the
process.
Despite his accomplishments, Mijango was suddenly—and quite dramatically—forced out of his
post last month, as was Francisco Salinas, whom President Funes appointed in early 2012 to head
the PNC. Both are retired Army generals. As such, neither should have been selected to occupy
top-level public-security functions, the CSJ’s Sala de lo Constitucional declared on May 17. The
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ruling echoed complaints from many on the left, including some members of Funes’ coalition, who
denounced the appointments of Mijango and Salinas as a violation of El Salvador’s 1992 peace
accords. Funes, a political moderate, came to power in 2009 with backing from the FMLN, a leftist
political party that originated during the Salvadoran civil war (1980-1992) as a coalition of guerilla
forces. The country’s previous post-war presidents all hailed from the far-right Alianza Republicana
Nacionalista (ARENA).
President Funes accepted the CSJ ruling but made it clear that he disagrees with the court’s
reasoning. In a radio interview, he accused the Sala de lo Constitucional of having an "antimilitary" bias. "The justices don’t understand that, 20 years after the peace accords went into effect,
the armed forces is no longer the repressive institution it once was," said Funes. The president also
insinuated that the ruling may have been politically motivated. It is "curious," he said, that the court
would wait until now—eight months before the next presidential election—to reach a decision it
could have made more than a year ago.

War of words
Leaders of El Salvador’s maras (street gangs) were also critical of the CSJ ruling, calling Mijango’s
dismissal a "low blow." They insisted, nevertheless, that they would continue honoring the truce.
"This process doesn’t depend on one minister," jailed representatives of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13),
Barrio 18, Mao Mao, Mirada Locos, and La Máquina gangs explained in a press statement released
from the La Esperanza jail in San Salvador. "The process will continue regardless of what the [CSJ]
justices or anyone else decides."
Keeping that promise could prove easier said than done. A week after the Sala de lo Constitucional
decided to oust Mijango and Salinas, the peace process received another, far more overtly political
blow. In a new campaign spot, ARENA’s presidential candidate, San Salvador Mayor Norman
Quijano, openly attacked the truce and accused the Funes administration of "negotiating with
criminals." Quijano had previously refrained from criticizing the peace process. Now he claims he
"doesn’t believe in the truce because the gang members haven’t given up crime." In an early June
television interview, the opposition candidate said the truce "benefits the gang leaders and fosters
crime."
Mara leaders Carlos Mojica Lechuga (Barrio 18), aka Viejo Lin, and Dionisio "El Sirra" Umanzor
(MS-13) responded to Quijano’s strategy-shift with some political provocations of their own. During
a May 29 television event hosted by well-known evangelical pastor Edgard López Bertrand, El Sirra
urged people not to vote for anyone who "boycotts" the peace process. "The next government
should support this," he said.
Questions immediately surfaced about how and why the two gang leaders—who are both serving
long jail sentences—were allowed to leave prison and appear on the popular pastor’s live broadcast.
President Funes’ new Public Security Minister Ricardo Perdomo responded to the controversy by
sacking the director general of the country’s national prison system, Nelson Rauda, another key
player in the 15-month-old gang truce. Perdomo, an economist who previously served as director of
the Organismo de Inteligencia del Estado (OIE), also decided that imprisoned gang leaders would
no longer be allowed to participate in jailhouse press conferences. Critics of the move worry that
jailed mara leaders like Viejo Lin and El Sirra will now have more trouble communicating with, and
thus controlling, their active underlings.
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Trying to "stay apart"
Even with the help of periodic press conferences, gang leaders were only ever able to exert partial
control of what goes on in El Salvador’s violent streets. In Ilopango, an outlying district of San
Salvador, 19 people were murdered in January 2012—before the truce went into effect. This January,
the PNC counted four homicides. Two people were killed in February, three in March, and just
one in April. The municipality is undoubtedly safer now than it was prior to the cease-fire. But the
gangs haven’t gone away. Nor have the rivalries, based on years of mutual hate, that threaten to
explode at any time.
"I can never imagine MS-13 as my friends, never," Javier García, a young Ilopango resident and
MS-18 gang member, recently told a reporter from The Observer, a British weekly. García, whose
cousin Kevin was killed three months ago after wandering into MS-13 territory, is currently working
as a baker in one of several government-backed reinsertion projects underway in Ilopango. "If I saw
[a member of MS-13] now, I would hit him, for Kevin. For this truce to work, we have to stay apart,"
he said.
Inevitably, the rival gangs still cross paths. Residents in Ilopango’s Reparto Las Cañas
neighborhood told the online news site El Faro that they have heard at least a half dozen shootouts
in recent weeks. On the morning of June 1, following one such gun battle, police found 120 bullet
casings on a neighborhood soccer field. Miraculously, no one was killed. But the incident frayed
nerves and caused tensions to soar among local gang members, many of whom—like Javier García—
have involved themselves in projects aimed at reinforcing the truce.
Earlier this year, as part of the peace process, neighborhood gang leaders exchanged phone
numbers. Following the June 1 shootout, one of those men told El Faro he is now far less inclined
to communicate. "Before, we were calling each other to resolve problems. But right now I wouldn’t
sit down with him…. It’s not easy to sit down and talk with someone after they’ve pointed a gun at
you," he said.

-- End --
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